Picketing, Contempt Proceedings; Right to Trial by Jury; Clayton Act: Section 22 by Goldberg, Alfred G.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 4 June 1928 Article 16
Picketing, Contempt Proceedings; Right to Trial by
Jury; Clayton Act: Section 22
Alfred G. Goldberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Alfred G. Goldberg, Picketing , Contempt Proceedings; Right to Trial by Jury; Clayton Act: Section 22, 12 Marq. L. Rev. 333 (1928).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol12/iss4/16
NOTES AND COMMENT
Picketing, Contempt Proceedings; Right to Trial by Jury; Clay-
ton Act: Section 22.
In the recent trial of the twenty-six strikers of the Allen-A Hosiery
Company, the strikers were given a jury trial in proceedings for con-
tempt for violation of an injunction. All of the accused were ac-
quitted.'
This is the first time that a jury trial has been granted in contempt
proceedings. The right to trial by jury in proceedings for contempt
in violating an order of court by an act which is also a criminal offense
is provided for by section 22 of the Clayton Act.
The constitutionality of this section of the Clayton Act was estab-
lished in the Michaelson case 2 decided in the October term in 1924.
The principal question presented in the Michaelson case is whether
the provision of the Clayton Act of October 15, I914 requiring a
jury trial in certain kinds of contempt is constitutional. A subordinate
question presented is whether the provision for a jury trial is mandatory
or permissive.
In delivering the opinion in the Michaelson case, Justice Souther-
land says:
"The provision, for trial by jury upon demand, as we shall pres-
ently show, is mandatory; and the question to be answered is whether
it infringes any power of the courts vested by the constitution and
unalterable by congressional legislation ..... .We think the statute
reasonably construed relates exclusively to criminal contempts. The
act or thing charged must also be of such character as also to con-
stitute a crime. Prosecution must be in conformity with the practice
in criminal case. Upon conviction the accused is to be punished by fine
or imprisonment, or both. True, the fine may be paid to the United
States or to the complainant, or divided among the parties injured by
the Act, as the court may direct, but that does not alter the essential
nature -of the proceeding contemplated by the statute. The discretion
given the court in this respect is incidental and subordinate to the
deminating purpose of the proceeding, which is punitive, to vindicate
the authority of the court and punish the act of disobedience as a
public wrong.4 If the contempt savors of criminality and the sentence
is penal, that, according to the books, appears to be enough.5 It
is contended that the satute materially interferes with the inherent
power of the courts, and is therefore invalid ..... .The statute now
under review merely regulates the power. It is of narrow scope, deal-
ing with the single class with the act or thing constituting the contempt
'Allen-,1 Hosiery Co. v. Brantch No. 6 of the Am. Fed. of Fiell Fashioned
Hosiery Workers Union, et al.
'Michaelson v. U.S. Ex Rel. Chicago, St. Paid, Minn. & Omaha Railway
Company, 266 U.S. 162, 69 L. Ed. 163.
' Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, Chap. 323, 38 Stats. at L. 738, 739, Sections
21, 22, Compiled Stats. Sections 1245 a, 1245 b, 6 Fed. Stats. Ann. 2nd ed. pp.
41, 142.
'See Re: Merchants Stock and Grain Co. 223 U.S. 639, 641, 56 L. Ed. 584,
585, 32 Sup. Crt. Rep. 339; Re: Christianson Eng. Co. 194 U.S. 458, 46!, 48 L.
Ed. 1O72, I075, 24 Sup. Crt. Rep. 729.
Wellesley's case, 2 Russ. & M. 639, 667, 39 Eng. Reprint 538.
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is a crime in the ordinary sense ..... .But the simple question pre-
sented is whether Congress may require a trial by jury upon the de-
mand of the accused in an independent proceeding at law for a crimi-
nal contempt which is also a crime..... .The only substantial differ-
ence between such a proceeding as we have here, and a criminal prose-
cution by indictment or information, is that in the latter the act com-
plained of is the violation of a law, and in the former the violation
of a decree. In the case of the latter the accused has a constitutional
right of trial by jury; while in the former he has not. The statutory
extension of this constitutional right to a class of contempts which are
properly described as criminal offenses does not, in our opinion invade
the powers of the courts as intended by the constitution, or violate
that instrument in any other way."
The court further says in regard to whether the jury provision of
the statute is mandatory or permissive. "The intent of Congress in
adopting the provision was to give to the accused a right of trial by
jury; not merely to vest authority in the judge to call a jury at his
discretion. ' 6
ALFRED G. GOLDBERG
See Rock Island County v. U.S., 4 Wall 435, 446, 447, i L. Ed. 419, 422, 423.
